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INTRODUCTION
The graduating class of 2015 is estimated to have a total education
debt—including federal and private education loans—of
approximately $68 billion. 1 Almost 71% of the 2015 graduating class
graduated with some form of student loan debt. 2 It seems like a major
news outlet runs a student loan story every week. 3 With indebtedness
rising, and a stagnant wage market, many students will struggle to pay
off their loans. 4 Homeownership rates have plummeted, the birth rate
* J.D. candidate, May 2016, Chicago- Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
Jeffrey Sparshott, Congratulations, Class of 2015. You’re the Most Indebted
Ever (For Now), WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2015, 7:59 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/05/08/congratulations-class-of-2015-yourethe-most-indebted-ever-for-now/.
2
Id.
3
See, e.g., Kevin Carey, Repayment Rates Show New Depths for Student Loan
Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2015, at A3; Gail MarksJarvis, Illinois College Students
Feeling Loan Pain, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ctstudent-loan-debt-1028-biz-20151027-story.html.
4
See Lawrence Mishel, Pay Is Stagnant for Vast Majority, Even When You
Include Benefits, ECON. POL’Y INST. (July 15, 2015),
http://www.epi.org/publication/pay-is-stagnant-for-vast-majority-even-when-youinclude-benefits/.
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is declining, and default rates are rising—all can be attributed to the
indebtedness of twenty-somethings. 5 Some of these debtors will
unquestionably be forced into bankruptcy.
Generally, student loans cannot be discharged through
bankruptcy. 6 However, there is an exception in the bankruptcy code
that allows debtors to discharge their student loans if they can prove
that maintaining their student loan debts will impose an “undue
hardship” on the debtor. 7 Congress did not define what exactly undue
hardship meant when drafting the bankruptcy code, so the burden of
defining this provision has fallen on the bankruptcy courts. 8 This
Comment aims to explain the context of the undue hardship definition,
and apply that definition in light of the Seventh Circuit’s recent
opinion in Tetzlaff v. Educational Credit Management Corp. 9
This Comment will: first, describe the genesis and the various
definitions of “undue hardship” that the circuit courts currently apply;
second, consider, through hypotheticals, whether the differences
between the circuits’ definitions create an outcome determinative
circuit split; third, explain the facts at issue in Tetzlaff, the holding, and
explain where the law regarding discharging student loans through
bankruptcy in the Seventh Circuit rests; and fourth, conclude that the
Seventh Circuit’s application is no longer consistent with the
bankruptcy code, and call for legislative action. Ultimately, the
Seventh Circuit no longer properly assesses undue hardship—the
definition and application has now evolved into a test that is more
difficult to pass than the already-exacting language of “undue
hardship.”

5

See Kelley Holland, The High Economic and Social Costs of Student Loan
Debt, CNBC ONLINE (June 15, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/15/the-higheconomic-and-social-costs-of-student-loan-debt.html.
6
11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8) (West, Westlaw current through Pub. L. No. 114119).
7
Id.
8
See H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. II, at 140 (1973).
9
Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff II), 794 F. 3d 756 (7th Cir.
2015).
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Background - What Does “Undue Hardship” Mean?
The United States bankruptcy system as a whole is designed to
relieve the honest debtor from the “burden of hopeless insolvency.” 10
In other words, bankruptcy can help achieve a “fresh start” for the
debtor. 11 Today, in the context of student loans, a debtor can receive a
full or partial discharge of federal student loans through bankruptcy if
the debtor can show that repaying the debt creates an “undue
hardship” on the debtor and his or her dependents. 12 This undue
hardship adversary proceeding looks very much like a civil bench
trial. 13 The debtor presents evidence in front of a bankruptcy court,
and the credit company contests the evidence presented. 14 Appeals are
heard at the United States District Court level, and further appeals
move up the federal appellate chain. 15 To date, the Supreme Court has
not heard an appeal stemming from an undue hardship adversary
proceeding. This section of the Comment will focus on the legislative
history behind “undue hardship,” the various applications of the undue
hardship definitions in the courts, and will conclude that these
differences in definitions can, in rare circumstances, create outcome
determinative results.
A. Legislative History
Congress originally enacted section 523(a)(8) in 1978. 16 The
statute was enacted in response to the growing concern that college
students would receive federal loans for their education and then
10

Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877).
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 133-34 (1977).
12
11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-119).
13
Douglas G. Baird, Edward R. Morrison, Adversary Proceedings In
Bankruptcy: A Sideshow, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 951, 951 (2005).
14
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017; FED. R. CIV. P. 43, 44.
15
FED. R. BANKR. P. 8003.
16
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994)).
11
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discharge those loans through bankruptcy as soon as they could after
graduation. 17 For example, a New Jersey resident filed for bankruptcy
fourteen days after graduating from Stanford Law School. 18 He had
already earned a business degree and a master’s degree in engineering,
and he filed for bankruptcy for the sole purpose of having his loans
discharged. 19 Another instance involved a Massachusetts couple; the
husband held a law degree, the wife held a graduate degree, and both
had a total of $20,000 worth of student loans discharged immediately
after graduation. 20 Stories like these received widespread media
attention and prompted congress into action. 21
At first, section 523(a)(8) provided that student loans were
nondischargeable unless five years had passed since the loan first
became due, or if an undue hardship would arise if the student was
forced to repay the loan. 22 This five-year provision was subsequently
changed to seven years in 1990 for very much the same reasons it was
instituted in the first place. 23 Due to concern over potential debtor
abuse, the seven-year provision was abolished in 1998. 24 The only
option for debtors to potentially discharge their federal student loan
debt is now to show undue hardship. 25
17

See H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. II, at 140 (1973).
See Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the
S. Comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong. 1078 (1976) (statement of Hon. Edward York, U.S. Deputy Commissioner,
U.S. Office of Education).
19
Id.
20
Jennifer L. Frattini, Note & Comment, The Dischargeability of Student
Loans: An Undue Burden, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 537, 542 (2001).
21
Id.
22
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994)).
23
Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990)
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8) (West, Westlaw through PL 101–
647) (extending the period of nondischargeability from five to seven years).
24
See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971,
112 Stat. 1581, 1837 (1998) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1999)).
25
In re Kuehn, 563 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2009).
18
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B. How Courts Define Undue Hardship
The United States Constitution requires uniform federal
bankruptcy laws applied throughout the states. 26 In theory, this
uniformity requires debtors to be treated alike regardless of which
bankruptcy court they appear in; however, in practice, when congress
has remained silent in defining certain provisions of the bankruptcy
code, different courts will interpret the provisions in different ways. 27
Here, for example, congress failed to define “undue hardship,” and
failed to provide any suggestion to courts on how to interpret that
language. 28 Because there is no legislative definition of “undue
hardship,” various circuit courts define the term in different ways. For
example, numerous circuit courts examine undue hardship with the
Brunner test, a three-prong test that examines if: (1) the debtor cannot
maintain, based on current income and expenses, a minimal standard
of living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans;
(2) additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is
likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the
student loans; and (3) the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay
the loans. 29 Conversely, the Eighth Circuit uses a totality of the
circumstances test. 30
1. The Brunner Three-Prong Definition
The seminal undue hardship case is Brunner v. New York State
Higher Education Services Corp. out of the Second Circuit. In
26
27

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 172-73

(1946).
28

See Fox v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 163 B.R 975, 978 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 1993) (“It’s troubling that Congress did not see fit to define the term
‘undue hardship’ in drafting the Bankruptcy Code.”).
29
Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir.
1987).
30
Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 322 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2003).
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Brunner, the debtor received a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1979 and a
Master’s degree in social work in 1982. 31 Approximately nine months
after receiving her master’s degree, the debtor filed to discharge her
approximately $9,000 in student loans through bankruptcy. 32 After a
brief oral hearing where the debtor described her “shaky finances” and
her unsuccessful attempt to find work, her loans were successfully
discharged. 33 On appeal, the district court took a harder look at the
debtor’s actual ability to pay off her loans. 34 Her greatest annual
income was $9,000 in the decade prior to the hearing. At the time of
the hearing, she was receiving $258 in public assistance, $49 per
month in food stamps, and Medicaid. 35 Her rent was $200 per
month. 36 The debtor further testified that she had sent out over a
hundred resumes in search of employment, but was unsuccessful. 37
The district court reversed the bankruptcy court—holding that while
the debtor might have proved a current inability to pay off her loans,
she did not show that she could not pay off her loans in the future, nor
did she show that she had even tried to pay off her loans. 38 This
rationale was the foundation for the Brunner test.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
judgment. 39 The Second Circuit further made the district court’s
holding into a three-pronged rule to determine undue hardship. 40 First,
the debtor must show that she cannot maintain, based on current
income and expenses, a minimal standard of living for herself and her

31

In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Brunner, 46 B.R. at 753.
33
Id.
34
See id. at 756.
35
Id. at 757.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 757-58.
39
Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir.
1987).
40
Id.
32
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dependents if forced to repay the loans. 41 This first prong has been
applied as the bare minimum necessary to establish undue hardship. 42
Second, the debtor must show that additional circumstances exist
indicating that the debtor’s state of affairs is likely to persist for a
significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans. 43 The
Second Circuit justified this second prong because of the “clear
congressional intent exhibited in section 523(a)(8) to make the
discharge of student loans more difficult than that of other
nonexcepted debt.” 44 Basically, proving a continuing inability to pay
in the future is more likely to show that the hardship presented is
undue. 45 Third, the debtor must show that she made good faith efforts
to repay the loans. 46 This requirement was necessary for the Second
Circuit to deter recent graduates from attempting to discharge their
loans while looking for work, like the debtor in Brunner, and instead
promote recent graduates unable to find work to request a deferment
of payments on the loans. 47
2. The Totality of the Circumstances Definition
The Eighth Circuit decision of Long v. Educational Credit
Management Corp. articulates the totality of the circumstances
definition. 48 In Long, the debtor was a thirty-nine-year-old single
mother. 49 She obtained her chiropractic degree by taking out
substantial student loans. 50 She passed her state exam, worked at
various clinics, and eventually owned and operated her own practice
41

Id.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
See id. at 397.
48
Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 322 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2003).
49
Id. at 551.
50
Id.
42
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up until her mental circumstances changed. 51 She began to experience
extreme fatigue, depression, and severe short-term memory loss. 52
These symptoms affected her work; her clientele dropped, and she
eventually closed her practice down altogether. 53 At one point in her
downward spiral, she attempted suicide. 54 After seeking professional
help, she fortunately began a recovery process. 55
At the time of the bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor in Long was
making approximately $1,163 per month. 56 She lived at home with her
parents and paid them $500-$600 per month in return for them to
subsidize her and her child’s rent, utilities, car payment, car insurance,
health insurance, cellular phone bill, child care, and food. 57 The
remainder of her income went to her loans, and her pursuit of a fouryear degree to get back on her feet. 58 At the time of the bankruptcy
proceeding, the debtor’s $35,322.81 in student loans had increased to
over $61,000. 59 The bankruptcy court granted the debtor an undue
hardship discharge because loan repayment would essentially impose a
twenty-five-year sentence in payments on an obligation that she could
never realistically expect to retire or reduce. 60
On appeal, the creditor urged the Eighth Circuit to adopt the
Brunner test. 61 The main reason behind this request was because the
debtor made approximately ten years’ of payments towards her debt,
but defaulted after she became ill. 62 If Brunner were to apply, she
would not be able to discharge her loans since she would not meet the
51

Id.
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 551-52.
58
Id. at 552.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 553.
62
Id. at 552.
52
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third prong of the test—the good faith prong. The Eighth Circuit was
not persuaded, however, because it specifically declined to apply
Brunner. 63 The Eighth Circuit took issue with the fact that “under a
Brunner analysis, if the bankruptcy court finds against the debtor on
any of the three prongs of the test, the inquiry ends and the student
loan is not dischargeable.” 64
The Eighth Circuit finally held that it preferred a “less restrictive
approach” in defining undue hardship and decided that the totality-ofthe-circumstances approach was best. 65 The Eighth Circuit stated,
“that fairness and equity require each undue hardship case to be
examined on the unique facts and circumstances that surround the
particular bankruptcy.” 66 The court further held that the totality of the
circumstances analysis considers: “(1) the debtor’s past, present, and
reasonably reliable future financial resources; (2) a calculation of the
debtor’s and her dependent’s reasonable necessary living expenses;
and (3) any other relevant facts and circumstances surrounding each
bankruptcy case.” 67 The Eighth Circuit believes in the simple premise
that “if the debtor’s reasonable future financial resources will
sufficiently cover payment of the student loan debt—while still
allowing for a minimal standard of living—then the debt should not be
discharged.” 68
3. How Other Circuits Define “Undue Hardship”
Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the majority of other circuit courts
examine undue hardship using the Brunner test. 69 The Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all have

63

Id. at 553.
Id., at 554.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 554-555.
69
In re Hicks, 331 B.R. 18, 30 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005).
64
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adopted some version of this Brunner three-prong test. 70 The First
Circuit has declined to choose a specific test. 71 The eight circuits that
have adopted Brunner all seem to have different formulations of how
these three general prongs are specifically defined. The courts agree on
uniformly applying the first prong of Brunner—the debtor must show
an inability to pay off the loans while still maintaining a minimal
standard of living and while attempting to maximize income—but the
application of the other two prongs has generated confusion. 72
Courts have differed on how to properly assess whether a debtor
will likely have the same circumstances through most of the loan
repayment period. The Seventh Circuit, along with three other circuits,
has defined the second prong of Brunner to require that the debtor
show a “certainty of hopelessness” before being allowed to discharge
his/her loans. 73 In these circuits, a present inability to fulfill financial
commitments is not enough for the second prong to be satisfied. 74
While no circuit has defined what this “certainty of hopelessness”
truly means, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have indicated that the
debtor can demonstrate a certainty of hopelessness through “illness,
disability, a lack of useable job skills, or the existence of a large
number of dependents.” 75 In the Sixth Circuit, proving the second
prong of Brunner requires a showing of “hopelessness” that is outside
of the debtor’s control, and showing that these circumstances will
70

Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 400
(4th Cir. 2005); Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d 382, 385
(6th Cir. 2005); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th
Cir. 2004); U.S. Dep’t of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th
Cir. 2003); Hemar Ins. Corp. of Am. v. Cox, 338 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003);
Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 306 (3d Cir.
1995); In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993).
71
In re Nash, 446 F.3d 188, 190 (1st Cir. 2006).
72
See In re Bronsdon, 435 B.R. 791, 806 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2010).
73
Oyler, 397 F.3d at 386; Frushour, 433 F.3d at 396; O’Hearn v. Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp. (In re O’Hearn), 339 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2003); Faish, 72 F.3d at
307.
74
O’Hearn, 339 F.3d at 564.
75
Frushour, 433 F.3d at 400; Oyler, 397 F.3d at 386.

125
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol11/iss2/2

10

Beehler: Tetzlaff: Has the "Undue Hardship" Test Become Undue?

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 11, Issue 2

Spring 2016

continue to be hopeless for some period of time. 76 The Third Circuit
defined certainty of hopelessness as “total incapacity now and in the
future to pay [her] debts for reasons not within her control.” 77 The
Fifth Circuit has not adopted the certainty of hopelessness standard,
but it has nonetheless defined this prong of the Brunner test to require
proving “total incapacity,” similar to the Third Circuit’s definition. 78
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit does not require that
certainty of hopelessness must be proven when evaluating “future
hardship.” 79 The Tenth Circuit has explicitly rejected a certainty of
hopelessness standard, instead requiring courts to take a “realistic
look” at the debtor’s ability to “provide for adequate shelter, nutrition,
health care, and the like”.” 80 These two Brunner-applying circuits
have a more lenient approach to the second prong of Brunner than the
certainty of hopelessness circuits.
Courts disagree on the third prong of Brunner as well. Some
courts have held that the failure to make any past payments on the
precise student loan debt sought to be discharged is a per se bar to
discharge because it does not meet the “good faith” requirement. 81 In
contrast, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly held that the
failure to make student loan payments does not, standing alone,
preclude a finding of prior good faith effort. 82 These circuits view the
good faith requirement as one that evaluates whether the debtor was
attempting to abuse the student loan system—rather than one that

76

Oyler, 397 F.3d at 386.
Faish, 72 F.3d at 307.
78
Gerhardt, 348 F.3d at 92 (quoting Faish, 72 F.3d at 307).
79
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mason (In re Mason), 464 F.3d 878, 882-83
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a debtor does not have a “separate burden” to show
exceptional circumstances beyond the inability to pay presently or in the future).
80
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004).
81
Lehman v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 226 B.R. 805, 808-09 (Bankr.
D. Vt. 1998).
82
See In re Mosley, 494 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007); Polleys, 356 F.3d at
1310.
77
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evaluates whether the debtor was aggressively paying off the student
loans under the circumstances. 83
C. Are These Definitions Outcome Determinative?
Despite the different verbal formulations, both the Brunner test
and the “totality-of-the-circumstances” test use similar information
and typically will lead to similar results. As the Tenth Circuit put it,
“the two tests will often consider similar information—the debtor’s
current and prospective financial situation in relation to the
educational debt and the debtor’s efforts at repayment.” 84 The choice
of “test” makes so little difference that the First Circuit refused even to
choose between the two. 85
Other circuit courts agree with the First Circuit. For instance,
while adopting the Brunner test, the Tenth Circuit rejected arguments
that the two tests diverged: “We do not read Brunner to rule out
consideration of all the facts and circumstances. . . . [Brunner]
necessarily entails an analysis of all relevant factors, including the
health of the debtor and any of his dependents and the debtor’s
education and skill level.” 86 Even the Eighth Circuit, the circuit known
for applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test, acknowledged that
whatever conflict exists between the two tests “may not be that
significant.” 87 And this makes sense; both tests are designed to define
“undue hardship,” after all. This section of the Comment will explain,
through a hypothetical, how the Brunner and totality tests can be
outcome determinative. This section will further explain how the
different formulations of Brunner within the circuits look like they
83

Polleys, 356 F.3d at 1312.
Id. at 1309.
85
In re Nash, 446 F.3d 188, 190 (1st Cir. 2006) (“We see no need in this case
to pronounce our views of a preferred method of identifying a case of ‘undue
hardship.’”).
86
Polleys, 356 F.3d at 1309.
87
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 779 n.1 (8th Cir.
2009).
84
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may produce different results, but do not actually do so when
employed.
1. Brunner vs. Totality Tests
Even though both tests evaluate similar facts, there is no question
that a debtor who fails to satisfy any single element of Brunner is
automatically ineligible for discharge. 88 By contrast, courts applying
the totality test simply ask the statutory question whether there is
“undue hardship.” 89 These courts consider a broad range of factors,
with no single dispositive consideration. 90 The “totality” approach
rejects “strict parameters,” allowing courts to exercise “the inherent
discretion contained in § 523(a)(8)(B).” 91
While, in many cases, both tests lead to the same result, the legal
profession recognizes that there can be significant differences between
the two tests. The “totality” test is “more flexible and often more
beneficial to the debtor.’’ 92 “The two tests often produce different
results’’ because of the compulsory-checklist nature of the Brunner
test. 93 In many cases the Brunner test results in no discharge where
‘‘the likelihood of discharge would have been vastly improved’’ in a
‘‘totality’’ jurisdiction. 94
88

See Brunner v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir.

1987).
89

See e.g., Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 55455 (8th Cir. 2003).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 554.
92
Adam J. Williams, Note, Fixing the ‘‘Undue Hardship’’ Hardship: Solutions
For The Problem of Discharging Educational Loans Through Bankruptcy, 70 U.
PITT. L. REV. 217, 228 (2008).
93
Kurtis K. Wiard, Comment, Brunner’s Folly: The Road to Discharging
Student Loans Is Paved with Unfounded Optimism [Buckland v. Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp. (In re Buckland), 424 B.R. 883 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2010)], 52 WASHBURN L.J.
357, 373 (2013).
94
Adam Schlusselberg, Comment, In re Davis, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 639,
650 (2009).
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One hypothetical can help show how these standards can be
outcome determinative. Assume there is an individual, Deborah,
whose debt is somewhat similar to the debtor in Long—she has an
advanced degree, say, a Master’s in Education rather than Long’s
chiropractic degree. 95 But, Deborah cannot find full-time employment.
Deborah has been searching for years; she has relocated cities just to
look for jobs, but nothing is working out for her. She shares the
cheapest apartment she can find with multiple roommates, she has not
bought a new car, nor has she bought any extravagant items since
receiving her diploma. She works as a part-time substitute teacher,
works an additional part-time job, and is seeking employment in
multiple job industries—but her efforts in securing employment are to
no avail. Assume that she can spend only $100 of her monthly income
on paying off her loans under her small salaries and high loans. Under
these circumstances, she should be able to pass the first prong of the
Brunner test. 96 She has attempted to maximize her income while
minimizing her expenses.
Now, let’s assume that Deborah gets ill. She loses her vision. Her
circumstances are not likely to improve, nor will she realistically be
able to utilize her advanced degree in the future. She will certainly
meet the second prong of Brunner— her prospective circumstances
are so dire that she will likely not be able to pay off her loans. 97
Finally, assume that Deborah has both private and federal student
loans, and she has only paid off part of her private loans because she
has a higher interest rate on those loans. Further, let’s assume that she
stopped payment on both her private and federal loans when she
became ill. This is where the Brunner and totality tests are outcome
determinative. Despite what clearly looks like “undue hardship,”
Deborah may not be able to discharge her federal loans in a circuit
applying the Brunner test because she did not pay off her federal loans
95

Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 551 (8th Cir.

2003).
96

See Brunner v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir.

1987).
97

See id.
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in “good faith.” 98 Under a totality of circumstances jurisdiction,
however, Deborah would likely be able to discharge her loans under
the same fact pattern because a failure to satisfy one prong of Brunner
is not dispositive. 99
While the Deborah analogy is severe and unlikely to occur often,
if at all, it illustrates that the tests for undue hardship do not always
work in the way that courts intend them to. Despite a debtor being in a
hopeless situation, outside of her control, a court would still—strictly
applying Brunner—conclude that she could not discharge her loans.
2. Are There Splits Within The Brunner Definition?
Brunner, in layman’s terms, held that someone could discharge
their student loans through bankruptcy if they: (1) cannot repay their
student loans based on their current circumstances; (2) will not be able
to pay off their loans in the future based on prospective circumstances;
and (3) have tried to pay off their loans. 100 As discussed previously,
the eight circuits that have adopted Brunner all seem to have different
formulations of how to apply the latter two prongs. The courts seem to
agree on uniformly applying the first prong of Brunner, but the other
two prongs could potentially create more outcome determinative
splits.
Some circuits, under the “future hardship” prong of Brunner,
require a showing of a “total incapacity” to pay the loans in the future;
others require a showing of a “certainty of hopelessness;” while others
simply require a “realistic look” at the debtor’s circumstances. 101

98

See In re Spence, 541 F.3d 538, 545 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that a debtor’s
choice to repay some of her loans does not demonstrate a good faith effort to pay all
of the loans held by a creditor).
99
See Long, 332 F.3d at 554.
100
See Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
101
See O’Hearn v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re O’Hearn), 339 F.3d 559,
564 (7th Cir. 2003) (requiring a showing of certainty of hopelessness); Pa. Higher
Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 307 (3d Cir. 1995)
(requiring a showing of total incapacity); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356
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Despite the differences in language, the courts generally agree that
student loans are mortgages on the future, so the debtor must prove
that her future is so bleak as to warrant a discharge of the loans. 102
Typically, this is shown to bankruptcy courts through testimony that
the debtor has: an illness, some disability, a lack of useable job skills,
or the existence of a large number of dependents. 103 Because of the
inherent discretion given to bankruptcy courts in weighing the facts
and testimony presented to them, it is tough to come up with a
hypothetical that would guarantee an outcome determinative circuit
split.
Returning to the Deborah analogy, under the facts presented
above—but also assuming she has attempted to pay her federal loans
in good faith—she would be able to discharge her loans in any
jurisdiction. Losing one’s eyesight due to circumstances outside the
debtor’s control would meet any test adopted in the circuits. However,
assuming that she did not fall ill, but was instead a single mother of
two children; assuming that she had been fired and was looking for a
steady job for five years while trying to make ends meet, the circuits
would potentially disagree on whether the second prong of Brunner
was satisfied. However, the disagreement would not be due to the test
employed, but rather due to the discretion of the bankruptcy judge as
to whether Deborah could definitely show that her situation was not
likely to improve.
The third prong of Brunner could create outcome determinative
splits if a jurisdiction holds that the failure to make any past payments
on the precise student loan debt sought to be discharged is a per se bar.
While the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly held that the
failure to make any student loan payments does not, standing alone,
preclude a finding of prior good faith effort—no circuit court has held

F.3d 1302, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (requiring courts to take a realistic look at debtor’s
ability to repay).
102
See e.g., Polleys, 356 F.3d at 1311.
103
See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393,
401 (4th Cir. 2005); Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d 382,
386 (6th Cir. 2005).
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that the failure does create an absolute bar. 104 In the cases where
circuit courts have held that the good faith requirement is not met due
to a debtor’s choice to pay some loans, but not others, the courts have
also held that other prongs of Brunner were not satisfied. 105 This is
because the circuits agree that there can be circumstances where a
debtor can be attempting to repay the loans in good faith, but simply
cannot do so. 106 To conclude, while the language used by the various
circuits to define the Brunner test differs, the actual application is not
outcome determinative because of the leeway the fact-finder is given
to determine what testimony is persuasive.
UNDUE HARDSHIP IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
This section of the Comment focuses on the state of undue
hardship in the Seventh Circuit specifically. The Seventh Circuit now
employs one of the strictest standards for discharging student loans
through bankruptcy, and it is important to understand why.
A. Background
While the Seventh Circuit has evaluated numerous undue
hardship appeals, two cases stood out more than others in the
formulation of the Tetzlaff opinion: Matter of Roberson, and Krieger v.
Educational Credit Management Corp. 107 This section of the
Comment explains both cases in light of how the holdings influenced
the opinion in Tetzlaff.

104

See In re Mosley, 494 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007); Polleys, 356 F.3d

at 1311.
105

See In re Spence, 541 F.3d 538, 545 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Tetzlaff v.
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff II), 794 F. 3d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 2015).
106
See e.g., Mosley, 494 F.3d at 1327.
107
Tetzlaff II, 794 F.3d at 758-59.
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1. Roberson
The Seventh Circuit first adopted the Brunner standard in Matter
of Roberson. 108 Jerry Roberson, the debtor, was still paying off his
student loans for his Bachelor of Science degree when his life began to
fall apart in 1990. 109 His marriage failed, he lost his job, and he was no
longer able to pay his creditors. 110 Later that year, he filed for
bankruptcy and attempted to discharge his loans. 111 The bankruptcy
court determined that Roberson’s loans were not dischargeable;
Roberson appealed, and the district court reversed the bankruptcy
court’s decision and discharged the loans. 112 The creditor, Student
Assistance Commission filed an appeal. 113
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and adopted the
Brunner three-prong test. 114 The Seventh Circuit explained its choice
behind adopting Brunner, stating that the three requirements
effectively weed out debtors filing for bankruptcy to primarily avoid
loan repayment. 115 The court continued:
The government is not twisting the arms of potential students.
The decision of whether or not to borrow for a college
education lies with the individual; absent an expression to the
contrary, the government does not guarantee the student’s
future financial success. If the leveraged investment of an
education does not generate the return the borrower
anticipated, the student, not the taxpayers, must accept the
consequences of the decision to borrow. 116
108

Matter of Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1134.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 1135.
115
Id. at 1136.
116
Id. at 1137.
109
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The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the first prong of Brunner—the
minimal standard of living prong—was the proper starting point for
the undue hardship inquiry because this information is generally
concrete and readily obtainable. 117 The court continued by reasoning
that the second prong of Brunner—the debtor’s condition is likely to
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period—is necessary
because student loans are effectively mortgages on the debtor’s
future. 118 The court next reasoned that the third prong of Brunner—the
good faith effort to repay loans—would be measured by the debtor’s
efforts to obtain employment, maximize income, and minimize
expenses. 119 Finally, the Seventh Circuit held that the Brunner test
requires a debtor to prove a “certainty of hopelessness.” 120
2. Krieger
In 2013, the Seventh Circuit revisited the standard set by
Roberson in Krieger v. Educational Credit Management Corp. 121 The
bankruptcy court held that the debtor in Krieger had adequately
proven undue hardship. 122 The creditor appealed, and the district court
reversed; holding that the debtor could have searched harder for work,
and that she failed the good faith prong because she had not enrolled
in a twenty-five-year payment program. 123 The Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court and remanded to reinstate the discharge
issued by the bankruptcy judge. 124 While this holding had more to do
with the district court misapplying the standard of review—a clear
117

Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1135-36.
119
Id. at 1136.
120
Id. at 1136; see O’Hearn v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re O’Hearn), 339
F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the certainty of hopelessness requirement
is part of the second prong of the Brunner test).
121
Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 713 F.3d 882, 883 (7th Cir. 2013).
122
Id.
123
Id. at 883-84.
124
Id. at 885.
118
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error standard for the factual findings of the bankruptcy judge—the
Seventh Circuit further elaborated on the standard set in Roberson. 125
The Seventh Circuit first discussed the third prong of Roberson,
and therefore Brunner. 126 The court held that the good faith prong
could not require a commitment to future efforts to repay—because
that would create a situation where no educational loan could ever be
discharged. 127 As to the second prong of Brunner, the Seventh Circuit
held that the debtor proved that her circumstances were likely to
persist indefinitely. 128 The court made specific note that the debtor—
had she signed up for a twenty-five-year repayment period—would
realistically not be able to pay anything towards her loans, and interest
would accrue, until her loans would be forgiven pursuant to the
plan. 129 The Seventh Circuit criticized the “certainty of hopelessness”
language in dicta, but ultimately held that Krieger was a scenario
where there truly was no hope without a discharge of the loans. 130
B. Facts of Tetzlaff
Mark Warren Tetzlaff was fifty-four-years-old at the time he filed
his bankruptcy and adversary complaint. 131 His student loan debt was
nearly $260,000 when he filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2012. 132
Tetzlaff’s debt was guaranteed by Educational Credit Management
Corporation. 133 Tetzlaff also held $18,940 in private student loan debt

125

Id. at 884-85.
Id. at 884.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 884-85.
130
Id. at 885 (“[Certainty of hopelessness] sounds more restrictive than the
statutory ‘undue hardship,’ but at all events the bankruptcy judge found that
Krieger’s situation is hopeless.”).
131
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.,
136 S.Ct 803 (2016) (No. 15-485).
132
Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff II), 794 F. 3d 756, 757 (7th
Cir. 2015).
133
Id.
126
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and $75,776.37 in private non-student loan debt. 134 The mix of federal
and private student loans was used to pay for Tetzlaff’s graduate
education at Marquette University, 1992-1994 (MBA received);
DePaul University College of Law, 1994-1998 (no degree received);
and Florida Coastal School of Law, 1999-2005 (JD received). 135
Tetzlaff also has a Master’s in Religion from Trinity International
University, but those loans, if there are any, were not at issue in his
bankruptcy case. 136
The original repayment period for Tetzlaff’s consolidated federal
student loan debt was twenty years. 137 Based on an interest rate of
4.125 percent and an eight-year amortization schedule through
retirement at age sixty-five, Tetzlaff would need approximately
$38,107 of excess annual cash flow per year to repay just his
consolidated federal student loan debt. 138
Tetzlaff currently resides in Waukesha, Wisconsin, with his 86year-old mother. 139 They subsist together solely on his mother’s Social
Security payments. 140 Tetzlaff is divorced, currently unemployed, and
has twice failed the bar exam.141 Prior to attending graduate school,
Tetzlaff worked in the employee benefits industry, as a stockbroker, as
an insurance salesman, and as a financial advisor. 142 He has been
unable to find work in these fields since completing law school. 143 In
addition, Tetzlaff is a recovering alcoholic and faces other challenges

134

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Tetzlaff, 136 S.Ct 803 (No. 15-485).
Id.
136
Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 5, Tetzlaff, 136 S.Ct. 803 (No. 15-485).
137
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Tetzlaff, 136 S.Ct. 803 (No. 15-485).
138
Id.
139
Id. at 8.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
135
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that contribute to his difficulties in obtaining employment, including
several misdemeanor convictions. 144
C. Procedural History
On May 1, 2014, the bankruptcy court issued an order holding the
loans nondischargeable. 145 The bankruptcy court found that with
Tetzlaff’s current income, he was unable to pay his student loan debt
and maintain a minimum standard of living—the first Brunner prong
was met. 146 The court turned next to Brunner’s second prong, and
concluded that Tetzlaff failed to meet it; he failed to establish that he
would be unable to pay back his student loan debt in the future. 147 In
doing so, the bankruptcy court noted that although “the ‘certainty of
hopelessness’ standard . . . was criticized in dicta in Krieger, it was not
explicitly overruled.” 148 The bankruptcy court then clarified that “even
if the lesser standard were applicable to this case, Mr. Tetzlaff has not
met this test.” 149
In analyzing Tetzlaff’s future ability to repay his student loans, the
bankruptcy court’s conclusions were based on its credibility
determinations of two competing experts, Dr. Ackerman (a forensic
psychologist hired by the creditor) and Dr. Gurka (Tetzlaff’s treating
psychologist). 150 The court found Dr. Ackerman’s testimony more
compelling as it was more complete and more current that Dr.
Gurka’s. 151 The court also noted that Dr. Ackerman tested forensically,
not just clinically, and therefore her testimony was particularly
144

Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff II), 794 F. 3d 756, 758 (7th
Cir. 2015).
145
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at IV, Tetzlaff, 136 S.Ct. 803 (No. 15-485).
146
Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff I), 521 B.R. 875, 877 (E.D.
Wisc. 2014).
147
Id.
148
Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 6, Tetzlaff, 136 S.Ct. 803 (No. 15-485).
149
Id. at 6-7.
150
Id. at 7.
151
Id.
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credible. 152 Her tests results showed that Tetzlaff was likely
malingering - he scored extremely high on the portion of the testing
that indicated he was feigning at least some of his symptoms. 153 As the
trier of fact, the bankruptcy court weighed all testimony and concluded
Tetzlaff did not establish he was unable to earn more money in the
future. 154 The bankruptcy court concluded that even if Tetzlaff was
continually unable to pass a bar exam or practice law, he would still be
able to find work if he put forth some effort. 155 The bankruptcy court
touted Tetzlaff’s educational accomplishments, intelligence, advanced
degrees, and continued good health, stating:
Even if he is never able to pass a bar exam, he has an MBA,
is a good writer, is intelligent, and family issues are largely
over. While he has challenges with past alcohol abuse and
interpersonal relationships, he is not mentally ill and is able
to earn a living . . . Mr. Tetzlaff’s marital problems,
personality problems, misdemeanor convictions, care-taking
responsibilities, and failure of the bar exams do not meet the
level of undue hardship necessary to discharge student loans.
They are typical of many bankruptcy debtors. 156
In its discussion of Brunner’s third prong—good faith efforts to
repay—the bankruptcy court took note of both Tetzlaff’s failure to
make any payments on the loans at issue as well as the fact that he
made payments towards a “loan” directly to Florida Coastal. 157
Tetzlaff argued that he made late tuition payments directly to Florida
Coastal for his law school education, and that the tuition payments

152

Id.
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 7-8.
157
Id. at 8.
153
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should be characterized as payments on a student loan. 158 The
bankruptcy court characterized Tetzlaff as a “malingerer,” and held
that this did not constitute making a good faith payment on his
loans. 159
Tetzlaff appealed this decision to the district court, which affirmed
the bankruptcy court. 160 The district court concluded that the
bankruptcy judge was entitled, as the trier of fact, to weigh and
discount evidence. 161 The district court held “[it could not] upset the
bankruptcy judge’s finding of no undue hardship, which was
reasonable given the evidence presented at trial concerning Tetzlaff’s
effort to find employment.” 162 The bankruptcy court’s decision turned
on its factual findings that Tetzlaff was feigning psychological
symptoms and not trying to work up to his abilities. 163 The district
court noted that “the bankruptcy court did not, as Tetzlaff claims,
apply the ‘certainty of hopelessness’ test . . . [T]he bankruptcy judge
concluded that Tetzlaff had failed to meet even the lesser standard that
he advocated for.” 164
D. Holding
On further appeal, the Seventh Circuit again affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s conclusion that Tetzlaff had failed to establish
undue hardship. 165 The Seventh Circuit specifically discussed the
second and third prongs of the Brunner test—since the district and
bankruptcy courts concluded that Tetzlaff could not maintain a
158

Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff I), 521 B.R. 875, 881 (E.D.
Wisc. 2014).
159
Id. at 881-82.
160
Id. at 875.
161
Id. at 880.
162
Id. at 881.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff II), 794 F. 3d 756, 761 (7th
Cir. 2015).
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minimal standard of living if forced to repay the loans. 166 Since the
bankruptcy court’s findings were findings of facts, the standard of
review was therefore clear error. 167
When looking at the second prong of Brunner—that there are
additional circumstances showing a certainty of hopelessness—the
Seventh Circuit was not persuaded. 168 Judge Flaum, writing for the
unanimous panel, noted that the evidence presented at trial indicated
that Tetzlaff did not suffer from clinical levels of anxiety or depression
and that he “may, in fact, be exaggerating his symptoms.” 169 The
Seventh Circuit observed that Tetzlaff’s academic degrees, prior work
experience, age, and commendable pro se representation in the case,
all indicated he was fully capable of earning a living and that his
efforts to maximize his income were insufficient. 170 The court justified
this rationale by stating that undue hardship encompasses a notion that
the debtor may not cause his own default. 171 Instead, the debtor’s
condition must result from factors beyond his reasonable control. 172
As to the good faith prong of Brunner, Tetzlaff argued that his late
tuition payments directly to Florida Coastal should count as a good
faith effort to repay his loans. 173 The Seventh Circuit disagreed. 174 The
court criticized Tetzlaff’s argument, holding that the good faith prong
is centered on the debt subject to the discharge action itself. 175 The
court further opined, “it seems that Tetzlaff repaid his debt to Florida
Coastal largely because he needed the school’s cooperation in
releasing his diploma and transcript. 176 As a result, the court affirmed
166

Id. at 759-61.
Id.at 759-60.
168
Id. at 760.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 761.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
167
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the lower court’s holding that Tetzlaff did not make a good faith effort
to pay down his loan debt. 177
E. State of the Law
After Tetzlaff, the Seventh Circuit is now one of the most exacting
circuits when it comes to the undue hardship analysis. Debtors in
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin have to conform to the rigidity of the
Brunner prongs, and prove standards that have intensified since
Brunner was originally incorporated in Roberson. 178 First, a debtor
must prove he cannot maintain a minimal standard of living if forced
to repay the loans. 179 Second, a debtor must prove additional
circumstances exist, outside of the debtors control, that would lead to a
certainty of hopelessness if forced to pay the loans. 180 Third, the
debtor must show good faith in attempting to obtain employment,
maximize income, minimize expenses, and pay off the loans at issue in
the adversary proceeding. 181 If a debtor is unable to prove all three
prongs in the original bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor is extremely
unlikely to win on appeal because of the clear error standard of review
employed by the courts when reviewing factual findings. 182
ANALYSIS
A. The Seventh Circuit Got Tetzlaff Right
The Seventh Circuit came to the correct conclusion under the
facts, that Mark Tetzlaff was a malingerer who could not prove that his
circumstances were outside his control. Now, part of this decision was
because Tetzlaff was not allowed to disclose expert witnesses who
177

Id.
See Matter of Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993).
179
Tetzlaff II, 794 F.3d at 758-59.
180
Id. at 759-60.
181
Id. at 760-61.
182
See id. at 759.
178
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would testify that he was suffering from memory problems that would
likely prohibit him from ever passing a bar exam. 183 Tetzlaff missed
the thrice-extended deadline to disclose these experts by eight
months. 184 Under a clear error standard, the Tetzlaff judgment was
fairly straightforward.
Tetzlaff’s case would have had the same result had it been decided
in a totality of the circumstances jurisdiction. Courts applying the
totality test in the handful of cases that do involve factual
circumstances similar to this case have had the same result. The Eighth
Circuit’s decision in Educational Credit Management Corp. v.
Jesperson is a good example. 185 The debtor in Jesperson had previous
was highly educated, had a J.D., and had just as much debt as
Tetzlaff. 186 Just like Tetzlaff, the debtor in Jesperson was determined
to be unmotivated to work to his potential, and was denied a discharge
of his more than $300,000 debt. 187 Tetzlaff is also similar to the debtor
in In re Shadwick. 188 Both Shadwick and Tetzlaff have J.D.s, and were
unable to pass the bar exam. 189 Shadwick, however, had three small,
dependent children, including one with significant disabilities, and was
still denied a discharge. 190 Both Shadwick and Jesperson were decided
in the Eighth Circuit—the circuit known for using the totality of the
circumstances test rather than Brunner.
There is simply no reason to suppose that a circuit employing the
totality test would find Tetzlaff’s evidence of an undue hardship any
more persuasive. Tetzlaff was ultimately denied a discharge of his
student debt because of his failure to work up to his abilities, his lack
183

Id. at 760.
Id.
185
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2009).
186
Id. at 784-85.
187
Id. at 784-85; see also In re Lofton, 371 B.R. 402, 410-11 (N.D. Iowa 2007)
(a 43-year-old debtor with three children and two graduate degrees was not
sufficiently maximizing his income to warrant discharge of this $300,000 debt).
188
In re Shadwick, 341 B.R. 6 (W.D. Mo. 2006).
189
See id. at 9.
190
Id. at 12; see also In re Tyer, 384 B.R. 230 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2008)
(discharge denied of more than $120,000 to 63-year-old debtor).
184

142
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2016

27

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 11, Issue 2

Spring 2016

of significant health issues, his impressive educational achievements,
the court’s credibility determinations, and the likelihood that he was
feigning psychological symptoms. 191 Precisely those considerations
would have led a court using the slightly different verbal formulation
applied in the Eighth Circuit to reach the same result.

B. The Seventh Circuit Got “Undue Hardship” Wrong
Where the Seventh Circuit erred in the Tetzlaff opinion was in the
third prong of Brunner—the good faith test. It was not necessary for
the Seventh Circuit to hold that Tetzlaff’s payments to Florida Coastal
did not constitute good faith. As discussed above, the court could have
easily affirmed on the additional circumstances prong alone. In fact,
this is exactly what the district court did in affirming the bankruptcy
court before the Seventh Circuit heard the appeal. 192 What the court
has now done is create a landscape where debtors may not be able to
discharge their loans despite showing strong examples of “undue
hardship.” 193 The Deborah hypothetical from earlier in this Comment
is an appropriate example.
To review, Deborah was the debtor who had: an advanced degree,
difficulty finding employment, and significant loan debt. Deborah also
had both private and federal loans, with the private loans at a much
higher interest rate. Deborah is rational; she chose to use her limited
income to pay off the loans with a higher interest rate first—similar to
how Tetzlaff paid Florida Coastal for his diploma and transcript so he
191

See Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff II), 794 F. 3d 756, 75960 (7th Cir. 2015).
192
See Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff I), 521 B.R. 875, 881-82
(E.D. Wisc. 2014) (“[T]he appropriate characterization of his debt to Florida Coastal
is irrelevant. . . . even if the bankruptcy judge had viewed the payments to Florida
Coastal as payments on a student loan, she would have found that Tetzlaff had failed
[to maximize his income].”).
193
See Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 322 F.3d 549, 551-52 (8th Cir.
2003) (where the debtor suffered undue hardship due to a mental breakdown, but
stopped paying the loans she had been paying for ten years due to her illness).
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could apply for jobs. 194 If Deborah then became ill and lost her vision,
or had a mental breakdown that an expert could testify was out of her
control, Deborah would not be able to discharge her federal loans
unless the Seventh Circuit decides to create an exception from its
holding in Tetzlaff. While Deborah would be able to prove that her
circumstances show a certainty of hopelessness, Deborah did not, in
good faith, pay off the loans at issue in her adversarial proceeding.
This is wrong.
The Seventh Circuit, in applying Brunner to the circumstances of
Tetzlaff’s case, forgot why Brunner was even instituted. The good
faith prong exists in the first place because Ms. Brunner attempted to
discharge her loans ten months after graduating without making a
single payment. 195 Now, the Seventh Circuit is confusing the overall
purpose of section 523(a)(8) with the nuances in applying a test
designed to encapsulate that purpose. Debtors should not be able to
discharge their student loans if they merely miscalculated their job
prospects, or if they made a poor choice in what degree to obtain.
Debtors should be able to discharge their student loans through
bankruptcy if they can show that undue hardship will occur if they are
forced to repay—bar none. That is the language of the bankruptcy
code, and that is what the Seventh Circuit must apply. With the recent
holding in Tetzlaff, the Seventh Circuit is now applying a stricter
standard than the code defines. Multiple factors go into each prong of
the Brunner analysis, so the holding that a failure to pay the loans at
issue is now a dispositive factor does not comport with the history of
the analysis. The Seventh Circuit did not consider the possibility that a
debtor could have a valid reason for not paying the loan at issue—a
reason that would still constitute good faith—and it should do so if
that case appears on the docket.

194

See Tetzlaff II, 794 F.3d at 761.
See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 397
(2d Cir. 1987).
195
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CONCLUSION
While Mark Tetzlaff may not have been the “perfect plaintiff,” the
rigidity of the Brunner standard—coupled with the stringent
applications of Brunner within the Seventh Circuit—creates a situation
in which people truly suffering from undue hardship will nonetheless
be unable to partially or fully discharge their student loans. The easiest
way to solve this in its entirety is for Congress to define what “undue
hardship” means within the bankruptcy code. However, recognizing
that this may not happen, the Seventh Circuit should consider stepping
back from the application of Brunner articulated in Tetzlaff. The
Seventh Circuit should instead adopt a less rigid standard; a standard
that gives discretion to the courts to determine what constitutes undue
hardship without forcing reliance on a single dispositive factor—such
as a failure to make payments to the loan at issue.
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